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BUSINESS LEADERS IN CHRIST v. UNIVERSITY OF 
IOWA1 
 
 In a free speech and free exercise case involving the Business 
Leaders in Christ at the University of Iowa, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the Southern District of Iowa by 
holding that University officials should not be granted qualified 
immunity based on the student organization’s free speech claim.  
 Business Leaders in Christ (“BLIC”), a Christian student 
organization in the business college at the University of Iowa, was 
delisted as a registered student organization (“RSO”) after 
University officials were not satisfied that BLIC’s revised 
constitution adhered to the University’s Human Rights Policy—a 
requirement for registration.  That policy prohibits discrimination 
based on, among other common forms of discrimination, sexual 
orientation.   
Student leaders of BLIC originally denied Marcus Miller, a 
student member of BLIC, participation in leadership because he 
disclosed he was gay and unwilling to forgo romantic same-sex 
relationships.  The leadership explained that Miller fundamentally 
disagreed with the organization’s beliefs and interpretation of the 
Bible regarding same-sex relationships.  Miller complained to 
University officials, an investigation was performed, and the 
University ultimately revoked BLIC’s registration as an RSO 
because it would not revise its policy of denying openly gay 
persons from participating in leadership.   
BLIC sued the University and individual University officials 
for violating its free speech and free exercise rights.  The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa found that 
the University violated BLIC’s free speech rights by deliberately 
exempting other organizations from compliance with its Human 
Rights Policy.  For example, it agreed to register organizations 
 
1 Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 991 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2021). 
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like the Hawkapellas, an all-female a cappella group; the House 
of Lorde, a group for black queer individuals or the support 
thereof; and the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, a 
group limited to Chinese students.  The Court held it was 
viewpoint discrimination to prevent the religious organization 
from expressing its views on protected characteristics while other 
groups were permitted to espouse other views and restrict 
membership to certain persons.  The Court also found a violation 
of BLIC’s free exercise rights for similar reasons.   
The issue on appeal was not whether any violations occurred.  
Rather, the issue was whether the District Court’s decision to 
grant qualified immunity to the University officials (from civil 
suit) on both the free speech and free exercise claims was correct.  
The Eighth Circuit panel, Chief Judge Lavenski Smith writing, 
explained that “qualified immunity attaches when an official’s 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”2   
The Court went on to examine applicable free speech case law 
from the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit, and 
other federal Circuit Courts of Appeals (persuasive authority) to 
determine whether the law was so “clearly established” that the 
University officials should have been aware that their actions 
implicated BLIC’s free speech rights.  The Court held that it was 
clearly established and therefore held that the District Court 
should not have granted qualified immunity to the University 
officials based on BLIC’s free speech claim.   
The Court agreed with the District Court, however, that the 
free exercise case law was less clearly established.  Therefore, 
qualified immunity on the free exercise claim was appropriate.  
Judge Jonathan Kobes, writing separately, would have denied 
qualified immunity on the free exercise claim as well, because he 
believed the law was clearly established such that the University 
officials should have known they were also violating BLIC’s free 
exercise rights.   
 
 
2 Id. at 979 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)).   
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McCARTY v. ARKANSAS STATE PLANT BOARD3 
 
 The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down portions of the 
statute governing the appointment process for members of the 
Arkansas State Plant Board (“ASPB”) as an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative power to private entities.   
 Appellants, Arkansas farmers, had challenged the ASPB’s 2018 
rule prohibiting the use of dicamba-based herbicides on crops 
from April 16 to October 31 each year.4  Among their arguments, 
the farmers argued that the rule should be void because nine of 
the 18 members of the Board had been unconstitutionally 
appointed.5   
Arkansas Code Annotated Section 2-16-206(a) provided for 
the appointment of one voting member from each of the following 
private agricultural entities:  the Arkansas State Horticultural 
Society, the Arkansas Green Industry Association, the Arkansas 
Seed Growers Association, the Arkansas Pest Management 
Association, the Arkansas Seed Dealers’ Association, the 
Arkansas Oil Marketers Association, the Arkansas Crop 
Protection Association, Inc., the Arkansas Agricultural Aviation 
Association, and the Arkansas Forestry Association.6  Seven 
voting members are appointed by the Governor under the statute, 
and two non-voting members are appointed by the University of 
Arkansas.  
In a 6-1 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the 
Pulaski County Circuit Court and declared the portions of the 
statute giving private entities power to appoint members to the 
ASPB unconstitutional.  Citing separation of powers concerns, 
Justice Barbara Webb wrote the opinion and explained that the 
Arkansas legislature cannot delegate away its power to make laws 
to private persons or non-government entities.  The Court also 
cited decisions from other state supreme courts holding that 
private entities may not appoint members to a governmental 
board without offending their own constitutions and the doctrine 
against delegation of legislative power.   
 
3 McCarty v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 2021 Ark. 105, 2021 WL 1807312.   
4 See Ark. State Plant Bd. v. McCarty, 2019 Ark. 214, 1-5, 576 S.W.3d 473, 474-76.   
5 See id. at 7-8, 576 S.W.3d at 477.  
6 ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-16-206(a)(5)-(13).   
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The Court reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court with 
instructions to remove the unconstitutionally appointed members.   
 
BURLEY v. BRADLEY7 
 
 In an interesting property case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
considered “Possum Ridge Road” and a dispute between two 
quarreling neighbors, Bradley and Burley.  The Court affirmed 
the lower court’s determination that the neighbors’ mutual road 
was a “private” road and that the gate and speed bumps connected 
to the road could remain.  The Court reversed, however, on the 
issue of which neighbor was responsible for the road’s regular 
maintenance.   
 In Union County, Arkansas, lies Possum Ridge Road, a long-
established road presently serving landowners Bradley and 
Burley.  In 2003, Bradley approached Burley about constructing 
a gate across the road to deter trespassers and thieves.  Burley 
agreed, and the county judge allowed construction of the gate 
where the road met County Road 302.   
Several years later, Burley hosted a church event at his home 
and requested that Bradley leave the gate open so that his guests 
could easily come and go.  Burley alleged that Bradley detained 
at least one of his guests at the gate.  Burley later withdrew his 
consent to the gate and contacted the county judge and sheriff 
about removing the gate.  The parties then sued each other over 
the status of the road, the gate, and speed bumps that had been 
constructed.   
 The Union County Circuit Court held two separate bench trials, 
one on the status of the road and the other on the gate and speed 
bumps.  Deferring to the Circuit Court under the clearly erroneous 
standard of review, the Court first affirmed the Circuit Court’s 
finding of a private road. 
The Court determined that the evidence showing occasional 
Union County maintenance of the road as a “courtesy,” along 
with an unofficial county document suggesting that that the road 
was “maintained” as opposed to “private,” was not enough to 
make the road a county road.  Rather, the Court credited the 
 
7 Burley v. Bradley, 2021 Ark. App. 105, 619 S.W.3d 49. 
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testimony of three former county judges who testified that the 
road has never been a county road.  Furthermore, the Court held 
that any prescriptive easement the public at large may have 
previously enjoyed in the road for access to the Ouachita River 
was “abandoned” after installation of the gate in 2003.   
The Court also agreed with the Circuit Court that the gate was 
a reasonable security measure for the private road, benefitting 
both Bradley and Burley.  It was not unduly burdensome to 
Burley or his guests.  As an appurtenant easement on Bradley’s 
land (the servient estate), the road may be modified with 
reasonable safety and security measures by Bradley.  Therefore, 
the gate and speed bumps could remain, with restrictions.   
The Court disagreed with the Circuit Court, however, that 
Bradley, as the servient owner, was solely responsible for routine 
maintenance and repairs of the road.  Citing prior case law, the 
Court held that the owner of the dominant estate, here Burley, has 
the right and responsibility of maintaining his enjoyment of the 
easement without unduly burdening the servient estate.   
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